

Religious Bourgeois Lifestyle of Celebrity Hijrah: Reading the Resurrection of the Muslim Middle Class Based on Cultural Imperialism and Global Economic Factors

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Abstract: *This paper attempts to analyze the bourgeois religious lifestyle of celebrities' hijrah from the perspective of globalization by focusing on how imperialism influences this lifestyle and why it is in line with the global economy. The theory used is the globalization theory of Gill Branston and Roy Stafford. The qualitative research approach is based on online and printed literature from books, websites, journals, and relevant research results. After the data is collected, the data analysis uses the interactive model of Miles and Huberman, namely data reduction, data display, interpretation, and conclusion. This study concludes that a bourgeois religious lifestyle is a form of Islamic identity for hijrah celebrities. The lifestyle displayed is bourgeois but does not leave Islam a symbol of Piety. The interpretation of the hijrah celebrity towards globalization is to construct it as a religious bourgeois identity. Cultural imperialism is a factor in forming the religious bourgeois lifestyle of celebrities who migrate in the identity displayed in the public space outside the network and in the public space in the network. The bourgeois religious lifestyle of hijrah celebrities can be in line with the interests of the global economy because they both need and complement each other.*

Keywords: *Lifestyle, Celebrity Hijrah, Cultural Imperialism, Global Economy*

Introduction

Discussing the Indonesian Muslim middle class always has its challenges, significantly because, theoretically and empirically, the division according to the structure of social class is constantly changing its definition according to changes in social, economic, and political conditions (Ali et al, 2017, p. 1-10). In line with the ideas of Hefner et.al (1994, p. 234–235), Andreotti et.al (2015, p.11), and Méndez & Gayo (2019, p. 1) that *social reproduction* production and reproduction are appropriately used to continue to question the new definition of the division of the Indonesian Muslim middle class. Jahar considered that the rise of the Indonesian Muslim middle class was not caused by religious motivation (read: Islam) but concern for Indonesian which is referred to as democratization. According to Jahar (2011, p. 150), a major essential factor is the history of colonization in the Dutch colonial era. Jahar's view is in line with

Jati's view (2014, p. 27) which sees the rise of the Indonesian Muslim middle class as social Piety tailored to the values of Medina or the democratization of the state. Until here it can be understood that the meaning of the Muslim middle class is no single and even has many interpretations.

The above two opinions have not complemented other factors such as referring to Azra (2017), Suyanto et al (2019) and Nizar (2020) that the rise of the Indonesian Muslim middle class is in line with the rise of global consumerism activity. Even Ansori concluded that the novelty of the Muslim middle class in Indonesia is associated with the rise of consumption, commodification, and practice of social tastes (Ansori, 2009, p. 94). The entire debate about the genealogy of the rise of the Muslim middle class in Indonesia can boil down to one important factor, namely economic revival (Dartanto et al., 2020). Elaborating the views of YUSDANI et al (2020) the social *piety* model built by the Indonesian Muslim middle class results from negotiations between Islam and global economic activity. This view further investigates the views of Jati (2017, p. 263), Budiman (2011, p. 482–489) and Zalpa (2017, p. 13) which explain that the rise of the Indonesian Muslim middle class is a political awakening of Islam in Indonesia.

In the era of globalization, the Indonesian Muslim middle class continues to experience a revival, especially in the socio-economic class. The lifestyle they displayed was to unite Islam with the lifestyle of the bourgeois class (in this study it is called the religious bourgeois class). A distinctive feature of the lifestyle they played was consumptive in the construction of the religious bourgeoisie. Luxury shopping is an example of religious consumptive behavior (Amna, 2019, p. 13). They want to remain *Piety* but cannot abandon the inherent status of the bourgeois class. Borrowing the idea of Jati (2017, p. 60) this Indonesian Muslim middle class is shaping the creation of the collective consciousness of the class. They build a community of study for example in luxury hotels or the houses of artists by inviting da'i bourgeois class (Efferi, 2013, p. 96; Maskur & Noor, 2014, p. 56) In addition, the urban Muslim middle class, utilizing *new media*, competes with each other for religious authority between traditional Islam and the Salafi da'wah movement (Zamhari et al., 2021, p. 65).

This paper only limits some hijrah celebrities, namely Ayana Moon, Syahrini, Larisa Chou, and Teuku Wisnu. They use the bourgeois religious lifestyle in their daily lives because they want to remain *Piety* but still want to become celebrities (Muna, 2020). However, precisely this religious bourgeois lifestyle is the main factor shaping

their identity in the public sphere. They are part of a new Muslim middle class trying to accept modernity by negotiating Islam and popular culture (Aini & Kailani, 2018). The Islamic community they built (e.g. Hijrah Fest) became a symbol of recognition as a public figure and a fear (Dewi, 2020). Exploiting Kailani's idea (2018) that the rise of the Muslim middle class is the rise of the capitalist-driven religious market after the collapse of the New Order. In line with Hasbullah (2012) idea, the rise of the Indonesian Muslim middle class is also caused by the transformation of the acceleration of economic development during the New Order. This description distorts the views of Afrianty (2020), Ja'far (2020), Mahmood (2005) and Tarusarira (2020) which explain that the emergence of Piety in the public space is an activity in order to gain political mass.

The discourse above gave birth to an important question: how did the bourgeois religious lifestyle of celebrities' hijrah based on the theory of globalization? Specifically, this paper will reveal how celebrities' interpretations of hijrah about globalization and explain the extent to which imperialism can be a factor in the formation of the religious bourgeois lifestyle of hijrah celebrities and why the bourgeois lifestyle of religious celebrities of hijrah can be in line with the interests of the global economy.

This paper begins with an initial statement outlining Jones & Slama's idea (2017) that the potential to spread Islam through social media explains why digital media has become essential to the Islamic life of hijrah celebrities. Hijrah celebrities can use various social media platforms to connect with their fans in various places. Hijrah celebrities enjoy the economic benefits of connecting with fans online directly. Social media can be used to develop an audience of followers to remain hijrah celebrities. Social media has also become a key site in spreading Islam in a new, more modern style driven by global economic factors (Shah et al., 2020). The result is a hybrid form of global capitalism that generates its tensions. The lifestyle of hijrah celebrities is displayed in the form of hybrid but does not leave Islam as an identity.

Research Method

The globalization theory of Branston & Stafford (2003, 2010) elaborated on two concepts: cultural imperialism and the global economy. In the end, globalization grew following the path of business in the late medieval period. In addition, globalization, is deliberate to be disseminated in the global world. The end goal is to create

interdependence between the world's peoples, especially in trade. Globalization can be realized successfully if it meets the conditions, namely 1) Occurs in a standard form as well as thoroughly in various parts of the world and 2) Always includes the development of various technologies and makes the communication process very fast (Branston & Stafford, 2003, p. 404-405). Globalization is often found in everyday discourse primarily about deregulated *markets* and the homogenization of cultures worldwide. Globalization is a transcontinental and transnational activity called trans-local. This activity uses networks already connected to various solid network media (currently dominated by the internet) (Hanners, 2003, p. h. 24-25).

This research is a qualitative study based on the views of Branston & Stafford (2010), Ida (2014), and McKee (2003) because the data source is only a library text. Libray research was chosen as a method to answer the problems that have been raised in this study. How to search for data is to search for journals and various research results through *searching* on the internet. The official websites selected for example www.sagepublication.com, www.tandfonline.com and some textbooks that are not published online. Data used from books, websites, journals, and research results relevant to this study. After the data is collected, the next stage is processed with flowing techniques that include reducing relevant data, presenting data, and formulating findings to formulate conclusions (Adeni, 2016, p. 19; Miles et al., 2014, p. 21-24). Data reduction is used to determine which data is appropriate and appropriate to the research theme. Supplied data is then done by creating a critical narrative to the data that has been selected. Next is to make an interpretation or interpretation to make research conclusions (Flick, 2007; Gibbs, 2007; Eight et al, 2012; Mezmir, 200).

Results and Discussion

This paper would offer a new study of the religious lifestyle of the middle-class bourgeoisie, especially hijrah celebrities that have not been studied by other studies. In addition, this paper complements several studies on the Muslim middle class as seen from economic factors and cultural imperatives. Regarding the terminology of the bourgeois religious lifestyle, researchers are looking for some literature and have not found any research conducted. Thus, religious lifestyle terminology can be developed in research to become an academically dictated theory. This research is still based on

literature studies so that further research is still needed with field *research (field research)*).

Some of the studies that have been done refer to dewi & fata research (2021, p. 1–2) which analyzes the model of da'wah of the muslim middle class living in the city. This Muslim middle class is looking for da'i that is considered in line with their social class as a Muslim middle class. Popular da'i they chose include aa Gym, Khalid Basalamah and Felix Siaw. The studies they do are then more closed in order to get material deepening. Globalization with information technology devices makes it easier for the Muslim middle class to participate in digital da'wah-themed studies (Nugraha et al., 2020, p. 175). Globalization with internet technology devices opens up space for them to express their fear online (Husein & Slama, 2018). Nevertheless, Dewi & Fata's research (2021) has not analyzed the lifestyle of the Muslim middle bourgeoisie more deeply based on economic factors and cultural imperatives.

Dewi (2020) previously wrote a dissertation to analyze the response of the Muslim middle class or hijrah celebrities to the da'wah of Salaf and Jama'ah Tabligh. The results showed that acceptance of Salafi da'wa and Jama'ah Tabligh was quite diverse. However, the most dominant acceptance is using negotiation. They try to reject teachings that are considered less relevant to their lives. Slightly different from Dewi (2020), even Triantoro (2021a, p. 19) examines the rise of the Muslim middle class formed by the market. The research findings provide an idea that the rise of Islamic expression of the Indonesian Muslim middle class led to the rise of Muslim middle-class business people who also popularized a new lifestyle (Husna, 2018). This study only looked at the rise of the Muslim class from the perspective of urban da'wah and has not discussed the bourgeois lifestyle based on global economic factors and cultural imperatives.

In line with the above view 'Aina (2018, p. 324) divides the Indonesian Muslim middle class into 4 (four) empirical, conceptual-theoretical, epistemological, and discursive typology. The Indonesian Muslim middle class typology is elaborated from the idea built by Heriyanto (2009). 'Aina (2018, p. 324) further explains that the existence of the Indonesian Muslim middle class is strongly related to the structure of state capitalism. The study of the Indonesian Muslim middle class in this study is based on a political economy approach. In the end, elaborating the views of Ali (2020), Khotimah (2019) and Pribadi (2019) the rise of the Muslim middle class is also inseparable from the cultural activities of consumption that are part of the bourgeois lifestyle.

Jati (2015b) elaborates in depth on the changing role of sociopolitical played by the disbursement of class structures in modern society. In general, socio-political changes initiated by the middle class turned out to be the main actors are youth. For example, the resignation of Suharto who was driven by the great power of Indonesian society turned out to be the most dominant actors are the youth in the middleclass category. So, in the historical context of the Indonesian nation, the division of classes in society is influenced by the economic structure. The middle class in Indonesia one side wants independence but on the other hand still has to depend on the structure of the state (Jati, 2015c, p. 219–226). This study addresses the rise of the Muslim middle class from a political and economic point of view but has not addressed more deeply the lifestyles practiced.

Interpreting the Bourgeois Social Class

If it traces history, in the time of European Feudalism, when the division of the middle class appeared, they were distinguished into landlords (the bourgeoisie) and workers (proletarian class) (see in Pregger-Román, 1983; Saad-Filho, 1998). These landlords that Roman and Velasco Arregui (2006), and Standen (2011) call the middle class who have a wide range of economic access to the highest politics. The bourgeois class has almost all the means of production while the proletariat has none of them at all (Kambali, 2020, p. 63). In the end the middle class has all the components in the structure of the highest grade. For example, wealth and education have access to ease, for example, the bourgeois class has access to ease compared to the proletarian class. Later development, Bordieu (1984, p. 169-171, 2005, p. 1-5). habitus theory divided social classes not based on land ownership or fixed means of production based on the culture of consumption and cultural capital.

When referring to the history of the French Revolution, in its movement the bourgeoisie always built the value of justice and individual independence that extends to the development of political economy. The movement certainly has a special purpose of benefiting their people, namely the bourgeoisie (Sungkar, 2007, p. 1–2). Every socio-cultural change in one nation or period of human history, the bourgeoisie is the main actor. These bourgeoisie have the characteristics of being educated and enlightened human beings, middle class, and young generation. The question of clothing, food, and boards is of course the middle class as a representation of the bourgeoisie is sufficient and may have advantages.

Bourgeois if elaborating the ideas of Della Porta and Portos (2021) and Roth (2019) is a terminology that refers to a group in society with a much more established financial establishment and higher education at the general level of society. However, in its development bourgeois terminology is interpreted narrowly and very connotatively. The bourgeois group was identified with the noble group during the time of Louis XIV who feasted on the country's wealth and then extorted the people with taxes (Rahman, 2005). If using the ideas of Karl Marx, society is divided into two social classes, namely the class of the rich (bourgeois) with full capital power and the class of the poor (proletarian) as a lower class society. In Marx's idea, religion is likened to opium in which in the end a religious person will not be able to understand who he is. Marx's idea is still to be reconstructed because until now religion cannot be lost from the life of humanity (Farihah, 2015, p. 423).

The Rise of the Muslim Middle Class

Muslim middle-class terminology appeared in academic literature debates beginning around 1984 (Sukarwo, 2015, p. 50). Its emergence is in line with the rise of Islamic populism in the political and cultural spheres (Ansor, 2016, p. 502–504). The meaning of Islamic populism in the urban Muslim middle class symbolizes the bourgeois elite and rulers (Azharhany et al, 2020, p. 249). If traced back again, the rise of the Muslim middle class is also part of the emergence of symptoms of post-Islamism (Jati, 2016b, p. 134). So, in this study, the rise of the Muslim middle class was also accompanied by an orientation on cultural and economic industry. Because the idea of post-Islamism can be formulated into two important parts, namely political ideas and socio-cultural ideas (Jati, 2015a). For example, the rise of the Muslim middle class in the big city of Jakarta is a social phenomenon that is a negotiation between market or economic interests, the practice of social Piety in the public space, and the meaning of lifestyle (Triantoro, 2021, p. 79). Because it is at this crossroads of the market, the rise of the Muslim middle class is an integral part of the interests of global capitalism (Hasbullah, 2012; Kailani, 2018).

As middle-class Muslims, they still want to build Piety and public figures. The hibryd identity was constructed to be an idol for other young Muslims. They built an Islamic identity but were unwilling to abandon their identity as *glamorous* celebrities. Their lifestyle is very *fashionable* for example using expensive

clothes. Fashion is used to meet religious rules (read: Islam) and generate economic benefits (Triasari & Zamhari, 2021, p. 1). Cosmetics (e.g. Wardah Cosmetics) usually have a relationship with them as an endorsed activity. The studies they do invite classy scholars as part of commodification. Deliberation studies are usually conducted at the homes of celebrities by inviting Ustad Abdul Somad, Ustad Khalid Basalamah, Ustad Syafiq Riza Basalamah, and others. Borrowing Yusri's thesis, this Deliberation Study, new media has united the Muslim community through a community of imagination (Yusri, 2021, p. 117).

Muslims' acceptance of globalization and modernity is due to moral *panic*. A global culture that is considered secular and threatens Muslims enters through various mass media platforms (Kailani, 2011, p. 1). Globalization and modernity cause spiritual arid then give rise to what is referred to as the phenomenon of hijrah and Piety in the public space (Teguh, 2020). In addition, the global culture cannot be rejected because it provides an opportunity to open the business economy as widely as possible. They observe this global culture in the hibryd Islamic identity. For them, Islam is not only a matter of worship but Islam *becomes* a social, cultural, and economic part. They include Muslims who are consumers of these social media platforms. Social media is not limited to being used for interaction but also a form of cultural and economic industry (Lengauer, 2018, p. 5). They became middle-class Muslims and social media celebrities who benefited from the economy from endorsed activities.

The rise of Islam in Indonesia impacts the position of women in political economic activities (Afrianty, 2020). Although, obtained to work outside the home, Muslim women in Indonesia still get challenges, especially for married women. The growing influence of Islamic groups (women) in Indonesia strengthens conservative Islamic values. Nevertheless, more and more Muslim women in Indonesia are forced to become workers to earn an undeserved daily wage. Kartini's successors, especially the Muslim middle class, built negotiations on Islamic values and economic needs. The demands of greater economic necessity require Muslims to share a role. In addition to family responsibilities, they also play a role in building the global economy (Sakai & Fauzia, 2016, p. 1-2).

The global economy then demands that women (particularly young people) redefine where and as what. This question is further elaborated by the Muslim women middle class in Indonesia. Globalization for them is a condition that cannot be denied.

Those who reject globalization will certainly be left behind and cannot play a role in the lives of families, communities, and nations. Although on the one hand, globalization introduced them to a more modern and secular life. Therefore, Islam in cultural and economic practices must be reconstructed to follow the West in economic progress. The modernity and secularism they received were then interpreted to align with Islam.

Acceptance of the global economy succeeded in raising the position of Indonesian Muslim women into the middle class. Those who initially only worked on household affairs can play a further role, especially in the economy. Indonesian Muslim middle-class women are answering the challenges of globalization by creating a variety of businesses. Hijabs considered religious teachings are then accommodated to produce economic benefits (Rahman & Khomalia, 2018, p. 33). Cosmetics that are the needs of women are also modified to produce economic benefits. Muslim middle-class women then played a role in developing the economy. Their rise in the economic field ultimately rejected the conspiratorial views directed at Muslim women.

Acceptance of Muslim Society to Globalization

Despite the debate among Muslims, globalization cannot wholly be denied its presence. This view pervades Moll's thesis (2010, p. 23) that globalization with mass media devices has made the lives of Muslim people secular. In fact, for Abioje (2011, p. 57) Muslims should be wary of mass media that are part of globalization. According to Aboije (2011, p. 57) religion displayed in the mass media is a fraudulent practice and must be watched out for. Based on these two views, the internet's presence with all its devices globalization can be accepted and then interpreted in different ways.

By borrowing Lupton's thinking (2015, p. 2), some of the above ideas, the world community today lives there is a digital sociology space (*we are now live in a digital society*). How far it goes to leave, Muslims will not be able to escape the globalization and modernization it brings. Using simple language, Muslims go to other parts of the continent even though they still cannot hide from globalization (Bakti, 2005, p. 476) Borrowing the ideas of Rozaki (2013, p. 199), Husna, 2018 (p. 227) and Alam (2018, p. 237) Muslims accept globalization and then do the commodification of Islam to be in line with Western culture. In the end, global culture is no longer considered an enemy or threat to Islam. Globalization presented through communication technology

devices is a challenge or opportunity that must be interpreted by Muslims wherever they live and live (Bakti, 2011).

In this description it is essential to re-read Hassan's thesis, 2006 (p. 226) ago on the relationship of Islam (in Hassan term called *ummah*) with globalization. In line with Riani's idea (2017, p. 51) that globalization encourages the formulation of the common beliefs of Muslims in the post-modern era. This belief means Islam is a teaching and a guide to the practice of life which in Islamic discourse is known as the paradigm of 'one religion, one culture'. Instant and global communication relationships now allow Muslims and non-Muslims to experience the different realities of Islamic culture. Such experiences reveal what is common among Muslims and what is different. For example, gender relations and dress codes for Muslim women are structured differently in Muslim countries such as Indonesia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. This idea is in line with Mansurnoor's thesis (2004, p. 103) that Muslims in Southeast Asia as a globalized society, they accept globalization. Southeast Asian Muslims welcome and participate in a globalized world, although they are wary of the origins and objectives of globalization action and design.

Since 15 (five) years ago, Hassan's thesis can be in line with some Islamic phenomena that occur today. Islam is a doctrinal religion, but Islam is a teaching that includes a way of life e.g. social, cultural, political, economic, and others (Vertigans & Sutton, 2002, p. 46). Furthermore, Hassan (2006) elaborated that globalization then gave rise to the contestation of identity between *the hybrid* (mixed) with the original (Islamism). Following the background of this study, there is a contestation of hybrid identity with the original (*Islamism*) by using internet media as a means of broadcast (Adeni, 2016; Filial Piety, 2018). The younger generation of Muslims (especially the middle class) accepted globalization with its modernity by forming a new, more popular identity. Their identities are formed through the social media space and expressed outside the network as well as within the network (Ishaq & Mahanani, 2018; Teak, 2016a; Widhyharto, 2014)

Even those who want authentic Islam cannot resist globalization with their devices of modernity (Jati, 2015a, p. 139–163). For example, the Islamism of the HTI model which is often regarded as an anti-globalization movement accepts and interprets it (Iqbal & Zulkifli, 2016, p. 35–36). Another study on the urban Muslim middle class (read: celebrity studies) that Salafis are well received by the Muslim middle class (Dewi, 2020,

p. viii). According to the views of Dewi and Fata (2021), ideologies may be Salafi but their identity uses a *hybrid* Islamic identity. The artists for example by the identity of Teuku Vishnu, Ari Untung etc, their identity is like Salafi (clothing etc.) but their lifestyle is celebrity. In the market aspect they build a community constructed by globalization. Their Islam cannot be separated from the context of economic and business interests (Khotimah, 2019, p. 91-93; Rohmatilillah, 2013, p. 78-79).

In addition to the above explanation, it is necessary to reformulate Islam's acceptance of economic-related globalization. The above description is still limited acceptance of cultural and religious contexts. For a long time McDaniel (2003) questioned Islam's relationship with the so-called globalization economy in Muslim societies. McDaniel questioned whether capitalism could function effectively in a Muslim society that had controlled its technology and economy. McDaniel considers that Islamic institutions in Muslim societies have always controlled the technology and economy developed by muslim communities. Despite the questioning, this scholar then made one thesis that the forms of Islamic economics would take in the new world order in the future. Emerging trends that trade liberalism, the expansion of capital markets, and acceptance of financial and industrial development are likely to be included as integral components in the economy of Muslim societies (McDaniel, 2003, p. 512).

In the previous year Zineldin, 2002 (p. 35) wrote a thesis on the strategy of Islam / Arab countries in the face of globalization. According to Zineldin, the colonization of Western countries can cause many problems and crises for developing countries, if they cannot compete or cooperate with developed countries. The existing economic blocs in Europe and the United States, Asia etc. have created a precarious economic situation that increases tensions between the South and the North. The problem is, Arab countries often compete with each other. Zineldin concluded that Arab countries could confront economic globalization by uniting their visions in global trade. Arab countries have a great need to work together, build trust and alliance with each other to achieve some synergistic effects and to be able to create economic balance in the global era. With socio-economic integration between Arab countries, Muslim societies will no longer depend on the West. (Zineldin, 2002, p. h. 35)

The thesis built by McDaneil above was missed on the current state of Muslim society. Globalization opened a new movement in the Islamic world with the rise of the Islamic economy. The emergence of Islamic populism in the economic field is the answer

to the entry of global culture in Muslim societies. These days, the Muslim middle class with its modern identity has risen both individually and in community to be the most significant contributor to the rise of the Islamic economy. Zineldin's thesis is also still relevant that the Islamic state is still dependent on Western countries in the context of the global economy. Arab countries then still lag economically compared to Western countries such as America and Europe. Moreover, The Arab countries are going through a difficult time due to their respective domestic conflicts. This conflict led to the failure of the economic development of the Arab countries (Benchea, 2015, p. 36).

Cultural Imperialism: Korean, Chinese, and Arabic

Today's cultural imperialism not only originated in American or European Western culture but shifted to Korea. America and Europe no longer control mastery of technology that continues to be renewable. Korea for example successfully developed technology that can compete with western nations. Call it for example are some brands of Samsung HP, LG, and others. The development of technology developed by Korea makes the cultural mecca begin to shift. Not only Korea, the Asian region has countries that also build their technology such as China and Japan. In the end, the shift in the development of technology helped shift the cultural qibla that views the lives of the younger generation and the Muslim middle class.

Indonesia is currently the younger generation is embracing Korean culture or commonly referred to as *the Korean Wave (Hallyu)*. Almost most Korean culture goes to several cities in Indonesia and becomes part of the lifestyle loved by the younger generation of DraKor themed films "Korean Drama" enter easily due to the ease of internet access. This Korean movie can be watched without going to the cinema to pay for tickets quickly. In addition to movies, different music with a Korean Pop theme also entered Indonesia. Korean Pop is becoming a new idol for the younger generation of Indonesian Muslims. Korean Pop shifted Western culture (*western*) which used to be the cultural mecca of the Younger Generation of Indonesia (Larasati, 2018, p. 109) So, now the imperialism of *Korean Wave* culture into the personal space of the younger generation which later became a fanatic lifestyle (Putri, 2019, p. 88-89)

Her face is beautiful typical of Korea with a hijab and a large veil as a symbol of hijrah. This Korean convert who now lives in Indonesia more often is named Ayana Jihye Moon. With a Korean face and convert status, she later turned into a celebrity hijrah. Aya

Moon's popularity started from Instagram, her work then became more popular awakening hijrah rend (Taufik et al., 2020, p. 41). Her figure is getting more popular due to her beautiful Korean face. As a hijrah celebrities from Korea, her figure was suspended to become a halal cosmetics advertising star under the category Wardah Cosmetics. Ayana Moon is also a hijrah celebrity with followers until this article was written as many as 3.4 million followers and the number of posts 1,150 posts. In addition to celebrities, this Korean convert also became a YouTube celebrity with a subscriber count of 649 thousand.

Another phenomenon about hijrah artists is that social media is crowded with news of Alfin Faiz's divorce (the first son of the late Arifin Ilham) with Larisa Chou. Young couples include middle-class Muslims who become symbols of young marriage in the younger generation. They later became famous through social media due to her decision to marry young. When he decided to get married, Alfin was very young at 17 and Chou was 19 years old (Tempo & Hayati, 2019). With the support of his father (Arifin Ilham), despite their young age they gave themselves to marry. However, in the end, they decided to separate in a young marriage age not until 5 (five) years. The failure of this hijrah celebrity marriage is proof that young marriages that are part of the hijrah campaign did not turn out to be a failure. This young marriage campaign on social media is also a form of cultural imperialism that attacks the younger generation.

Larissa Chou is a Chinese mu'alaf who later settled in Indonesia. Despite deciding to become a mua'alaf, Larisa Chou's family remains a Christian. Still young, but Chou is a middle-class Muslim who has much business. After marrying Alfin Faiz, Chou became more popular as a hijrah celebrity. Chou is a beautiful convert born in 1996 in Cirebon and was previously Buddhist and Christian. Chou's father, Chou Ling Ling, was a popular Christian motivator. Despite his Chinese ancestry, Chou was born and grew up in the city of Bandung (Rochimawati, 2020). Chou represents typical Chinese making it easy for young Indonesians, especially the Muslim middle class. If analyzed more deeply, Chou became famous not only because of being a convert but this typical Chinese face that was more of a factor.

Other hijrah celebrities who can be said to represent Arabic culture are Teuku Wisnu and Shireen Sungkar. This pair of hijrah celebrities became a representation of Arab culture among the muslim middle class of celebrities. Teuku Wisnu and Shiren Sungkar were met in a national television soap opera titled "Cinta Fitri". After getting

married and deciding to emigrate, their appearance changed. Teuku Wisnu with a beard, shorts, and Salafist model clothes. Still the lifestyle he brought was a middle-class celeb. Shiren Sungkar also emigrated using a large robe and jilab. After marrying and becoming hijrah celebrities, they built a bourgeois religious lifestyle.

In a wave of glabization, the hijrah community in Indonesia is a complex and paradoxical phenomenon. These communities can be identified by how their members express online Piety on social media e.g. facebook, YouTube, Instagram etc. (Husein & Slama, 2018). This position on social media affects the religious and ideological values of members in the Hijrah community. Facebook is one of the authoritative sources and Instagram, Twitter, WhatsApp, and offline meetings in increasing religious knowledge by the hijrah community. The presence of social media encourages religious shallowness. Looking at the ideological side, the hijrah community shows ideological hybridity. Their ideological hygiene is taken from various societies and streams from Islamic scientific authorities (Hidayat, Sholihin, & Wanto, 2021, p. 118).

Based on some of the above descriptions, cultural imperialism is a significant part of global economic activity. Because it is economically oriented, religion is accommodated to be accepted by the Muslim community and sold for profit. This commodification of religion simultaneously awakens the halal industry (Sharia economy). In practice, this hijrah celebrity gave rise to a consumptive lifestyle. In the public area, hijrah celebrities want to appear ta'wa but do not want to leave the lifestyle as a public figure. They consume luxury goods as part of the promotion of self-esteem. Before hijrah, their lifestyle was material-oriented after hijrah still using the identity. The bourgeois lifestyle of religious celebrities hijrah is in an environment of free market interest because it brings economic benefits.

Global Economic Interests

According to Kompas and CNN Indonesia, in 2020 Indonesia is a country with a Muslim majority population, through Muslim fashion will become the center of world fashion. The rise of Muslim fashion helped Indonesia increase the number of industries both middle and lower. This condition is in line with the awareness of the Indonesian Muslim middle class to be able to accept and adjust to the modern lifestyle (Muntazori & Sunarto, 2019). Traditional Islam does not have to be addressed with globalization and modernity to grow a broad economy. In the global realm, it will encourage the growth of

Muslim fashion market share. The trend of globalization opens home for Indonesia to develop the *halal industry*. There is a wide range of global halal industry products such as food processing, pharmaceutical products, cosmetics, toiletries, health facilities (medical), and others.

Indonesia's Muslim middle-class market continues to grow, Ali noted this phenomenon as a lucrative muslim middle class market share. The rise of the Muslim middle class market is in line with the acceptance of Muslim society towards globalization. One thing that is also growing in line with the rise of this Muslim class market is the consumptive lifestyle (Zencirci, 2020, p. 1). Jati (2015b, p. 1) explains that symbolic needs are the most important part of the muslim middle class. The lifestyle of selling with consumptive slices makes the need for identity shift from secondary to tertiary. For example, the utilization of digital finance into tertiary needs is just a symbolic need. The consumptive lifestyle transition is the influence of globalization called *technoscape*. The Muslim middle class's intense and massive use of the internet in public spaces is called *technoscape*.

Globalization is accepted then interpreted as part of a vast da'wah space. Hijrah celebrities and other Muslim middle classes think that embroidery is not enough. If Islam is only practiced ritually, for example worship in mosques, then it narrows the meaning of Islam. The path taken is to bring Islam to the public space to become a value. Islam is packaged in such a way as to appeal to the wider community. Islam no longer has to appear textually but can align with modern culture. The celebrities then flocked to build products in halal frames although all of them will encourage a consumptive attitude (Khotimah, 2019).

However, the rise of the halal industry also aroused the phenomenon of consumerism in Muslim communities. The consumerism of the Muslim middle class is certainly not okay its influence on social society. Exploring the view of Farid & Saputra (2021, p. 255) that global consumerism driven by media growth is the cause of some environmental damage. In addition, such a consumptive lifestyle can cause social jealousy that raises various problems of radicalism among the younger generation of Muslims (Bamualim et al., 2018, p. 6). In addition to these problems, the way of dressing does show a symbol of Piety in public. The Piety for Arizal is just a symbol constructed to be religious or Islamic. The constructed symbol of Piety is not based on religious orders but follows the desire to build an image in the public space. The desire to build an image

impacts consumerism that cannot be separated from global capitalism. Capitalism arouses the desire for middle-class Muslims as bourgeois but remains religious (Arizal, 2016, p. 78).

This trend of hijrah is referred to as resistance to political economy and capitalism. Although they will never be able to escape the environment of global capitalism. For the younger generation and middleclass Muslims, hijrah are not only to be recognized for their existence in the public space. Their emigration is a resistance to incoming global industrial activity. The trend of hijrah artists then initiated a lot of the rise of the halal industry and consumption culture (Afrida Arianl Muna, 2020, p. 76). This idea gives the idea that celebrity hijrah is becoming an activity that is inseparable from the interests of the global economy. This whole description interrupts Lyansari's idea that the trend of celebrity hijrah is a shift in psychological thinking while forming a new economic lifestyle (Lyansari, 2019, p. 211–212).

The religious bourgeois lifestyle that became the identity of the hijrah celebrity because Islam was constructed only to the extent of material (capitalistic) processes rather than as a process of religiosity or spirituality. Their lifestyle changes changed after the New Order regime was deposed and opened up opportunities for market arrogance labeled sharia. Their social security in the public space then gave rise to various economic potentials in Indonesia. Various halal industries later became part of economic activity developed by the Muslim middle class. Globalization opens up opportunities for the Muslim middle class to integrate Islamic Piety with capitalism in a neo-liberal environment. The economic rise of the Muslim middle class in Indonesia is ultimately inseparable from the role of spiritual lifestyle agents who simultaneously introduce consumptive lifestyles (Utama, 2016, p. 113).

The consumptive Lifestyle of Islam that became the identity of the Muslim middle class has been described by Greg Fealy since 2008. According to Fealy, it is evident that the consumption of Islam as a religious commodity has been widespread and developing in Indonesia and has a great economic and cultural impact. In part, the commodification of Islam reflects the increasing religiosity in Indonesian society. However, it is also true that the growth of consumption and the superiority of Islamic products encourages further Islamization. Thus, a kind of cycle is formed in which commodified Islam is a product and causative factor in accelerating religiosity. It can be said that, devout Muslims increasingly like to consume Islamic products is part of the expression of their

faith. The more they consume products (shopping etc.) the more significant the market for Islamic commodities. The more sophisticated the product and the more regular the Islamized consumption pattern (Grea Fealy, 2008, p. 26-27).

The consumptive lifestyle that plagued hijrah celebrities as part of the Muslim middle class aligns with Hamudy and Hamudy's thesis. Hijrah has become very popular with Muslims because of the same view that Islam can be practiced easily despite being in a globalized world. The practice of hijrah does not always mean limited rites of worship in the mosque only. Hijrah became a practice of religious shifts that went from traditional to modern forms although sometimes it had to go hand in hand with secularism. In the end, ideological values based on religious commodification and consumption practices are fundamental driving factors for the changing trend of hijrah among the Muslim middle class (Hamudy & Hamudy, 2020, p. 113)

In a study attended by artists, Syahrini asked with kemayu to the preacher, Ustadz Abdul Somad. Syahrini suddenly emigrated and wore a hijab even though she was still open. Despite emigrating and participating in the Musyarawah Study, Syaharini is still a public figure. His lifestyle was dominated by bourgeois rather than religious. As a hijrah celebrity, even Syahrini is synonymous with *branded* goods. This hijrah celebrity with a bourgeois lifestyle has the only Hermes bag in Indonesia that costs 2 (two) billion. In addition, Syahrini also has home clothes with a price of Up to Rp 46 million. The blouse she wore reached a price of Rp 5.9 million and her pants reached Rp 5.2 million. Coupled with a luxury watch from Piaget priced at Rp 524 million (Dewi & Santoso, 2020).

Conclusion

Based on the literature studies that have been outlined above, this paper concludes that hijrah celebrities have different ways of interpreting the presence of globalization and its products. Most hijrah celebrities accept globalization and then make interpretations to be in line with Islamic values. For hijrah celebrities who accept, globalization provides cultural and economic benefits. Traditional Islam must be united with secular Western culture so that hijrah celebrities remain public figures. The diversity of hijrah eventually accepts globalization by forming a new *hybrid* identity constructed in the outer public space and the public space in the network.

Cultural imperialism is a factor in forming the bourgeois religious lifestyle of hijrah celebrities because it has formed online Piety in the public space. The modern liyan culture they accepted was then interpreted to form the bourgeois Islamic identity. So cultural imperatives such as China, Arabia, and Korea are not considered enemies. Hijrah celebrities use the culture of the three countries as part of the notion of modern Islam. The Islamic identity formed by cultural imperialism is displayed in line with the construction of hijrah celebrities of Arab, Chinese, and Korean descent. Although in this aspect, Islamic identity in indonesianness becomes no less desirable as an Islamic identity as the opposite of hijrah.

The bourgeois religious lifestyle of hijrah celebrities can be in line with the interests of the global economy because they both need and complement each other. The bourgeois religious lifestyle is used because of the acceptance and interpretation of global consumerism considered secular. The religious bourgeois lifestyle then becomes part of the object of global cultural consumerism which is in line with the interests of capitalism. The bourgeois religious lifestyle of hijrah celebrities is a form of acceptance and unique interpretation of the globalization system and its accompanying aspects. Thus, it can be said that this lifestyle is a manifestation of the integration of globalization and Islam. In the end, hijrah celebrities displaying a religious bourgeois lifestyle is an identity that is recognized because it is in line with global economic activity.

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