

Contesting Da'wah Authority in Indonesian Mosques and Islamic Organizations

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Abstract

In the process of segregation, every social institution, including religious ones, experiences both conflict and integration, as well as consensus and contestation. As a religious social institution, the mosque serves as a place for prostration in *mahdhah* worship and as a center for community development. This article examines two critical issues: first, the shifting dynamics of the mosque's function as a social institution in Islamic preaching, and second, the negotiation and contestation of Islamic preaching spaces between mosques and other Islamic mass organizations. Employing a qualitative approach, this study conducts an in-depth analysis of primary data sources. Key insights were gathered through participatory observation of behavioral processes and activities within the research context. The research conducted in Kudus revealed several key findings: First, as a site for disseminating Islamic values, mosques serve as a vital medium for employing diverse preaching methods. Second, the overlapping social roles shared with other institutions have led to *struggles, shifts*, and even *takeovers* of functions traditionally held by religious organizations—including mosques. Consequently, mosques have transformed into contested arenas for political piety.

Keywords;

Mosque, Islamic Mass Organization, Contestation, Preaching Authority

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1. INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, the dynamic role of mosques as centers of Islamic preaching has led to new patterns of authority struggles among institutions sharing similar functions. Historically, mosques have served as hubs for religious propagation and community development. (Rifa'i, 2022) As such, they inevitably encounter complex social dynamics marked by continuous processes of negotiation and contestation among diverse social actors.

The mosque is a holy place for Muslims that has a function other than as a place of worship (worshiping Allah), it also functions as a center for community activities for Muslims. As a holy place among Muslims, the mosque is positioned above the boundaries of groups and other social barriers, even in the holy book the word mosque is based (*mudhaf*) on the Almighty "*masajida Allah*" (mosques of



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Allah), (meefta, 2014) and not "*masajida al muslimin*" (mosques of Muslims). This shows that under the auspices of the mosque, the Muslim community is bound and united in the law of Allah SWT, without being limited by religious ideology, tribe, or certain groups. The power of divinity covers the size of the ego and the strength of group sentiment. Hence in the time of the Prophet Muhammad SAW, the mosque was a place of shelter for all groups and tribes in the Arabian peninsula who were Muslim.

From the historical records, it can be read that the existence of mosques has two functions. First, the mosque is a holy place for Muslims where prayer as a form of devotion to the Almighty. Second, the mosque was built to build civilization, where ideas for developing society in the social, cultural, political, and even economic fields are discussed and formulated. Indirectly, the mosque, in its great function, can be said to be the center of Islamic preaching, both individually (*fardiyah*) and socially (*jam'iyah*). This mosque function has at least been practiced in the process of Islamic civilization in the period after the Prophet Muhammad died until the modern era.

In the modern era, the success of social movements in various Muslim countries is largely supported by mosques as the basis of social movements. In the 1970s in Egypt, the existence of mosques grew rapidly, especially before the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981. In 1970, the number of private mosques in Egypt was around 20,000 units; in 1981 it jumped to 46,000 private mosques, plus 6000 government mosques. The rapid growth of the number of mosques in Egypt in these years was not without reason, because most of the Islamic revivalist movements pioneered by the Muslim Brotherhood were built under the auspices of non-governmental mosques that taught religious militancy and were critical of the socio-political conditions in the country. (Tibi, 1999) The peak of this movement was the assassination of President Anwar Sadat, which was allegedly the result of a conspiracy between the Al Jihad movement and the military faction.

Mosques as a basis for socio-political movements also occurred in Indonesia, especially before the fall of the New Order regime. Socio-political movements in Indonesia during the New Order era were indeed limited by development policies that were the main pillars of the government, including socio-religious movements, even so, socio-religious movements that were co-opted by the policy of "political corporatism" (Porter, 2002) grew among the educated middle class (students) who practiced socio-religious movement activities in mosques or campus prayer rooms. At least on large campuses in Java, such as the University of Indonesia (UI), Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), and Gadjah Mada University (UGM), Yogyakarta became the center of socio-religious movements centered in mosques in the form of religious study forums and campus da'wah movements. In 1998, this network of young Muslim activists joined the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Unity (KAMMI). This movement later became one of the initiators of the birth of the Justice Party (PK) which later metamorphosed into the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). (Rahmat, 2008)

One important note that needs to be studied more deeply is when the mosque becomes one of the functions of a social movement, then at this time the mosque must also negotiate, even face (contest) with other institutions that are also the basis of the social movement. This happens because the function of the mosque that encompassed socio-political functions during the time of the Prophet Muhammad, is now also taken over by social institutions and religious mass organizations. The takeover of the social function of the mosque is inevitable because several reasons support it. First, institutional modernization demands work specifications. Modernization always requires professional work with a specific division of labor. (Lemert, 1999) This tug-of-war between the division of labor and the takeover of work often causes tension between new and old institutions. What happened with the division of roles between mosques and religious mass organizations is a concrete example of this tension.

The second reason is social polarization and segregation. The proliferation of community organizations due to the opening of the tap of freedom of speech in the jargon of democracy has given rise to many interests amid society. These various interests are then framed in an institution recognized by society and received legitimacy from the government. (Menoh, 2015) The existence of diverse institutions in terms of interests and ideologies is also one of the triggers of social friction that may result in social conflict. In such a position, the existence of mosques becomes one of the institutions that is dragged into the vortex of social conflict, and often, the social conflict is wrapped in religious and ideological sentiments.

Third, the increasing complexity of social problems that require programmed handling, both long-term and short-term. The spread of social problems due to population growth and socio-cultural dynamics requires complex, measurable and planned handling. The existence of mosques as part of socio-religious institutions is certainly limited by values and norms that are macro, plural, and transcendental. Therefore, when mosques face short-term-oriented problems such as practical politics and activities oriented towards group or class interests, they will encounter ethical problems. It is in this position that religious mass organizations, *jamiyyah*, or the like are born and take over neglected social functions.

These problems are certainly not only experienced by many mosques in Indonesia, the number of which has reached no less than 289,640 (Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia, 2022a), but also occur in many mosques in Kudus Regency. Currently, the number of mosques in Kudus Regency, according to Danang Mahendra's study in 2017, was recorded at no less than 661 mosques according to the latest data from the Indonesian Mosque Council (DMI) of Kudus Regency, totaling 720 units. (Mahendra, 2017) The existence of hundreds of mosques is spread across various sub-districts with very diverse roles. Apart from being a *Jami'* mosque (used for Friday prayers), some are not used for Friday prayers. On average, mosques in Kudus Regency are used as centers of Islamic preaching for places of prayer and as a means of study and community.

The high enthusiasm of the community towards the existence of mosques is because, theologically, mosques are holy places for Muslims. Moreover, mosques are fortresses of piety that distinguish between pious and non-pious people. Mosques are a symbol of the Muslim community's commitment to universal Islam. All forms of evil, whether committed by individuals or institutions, are common enemies for those who claim to be pious. This assumption then makes mosques function as centers of movements against evil committed by individuals or even state institutions. Resistance against evil, especially those committed by institutions, does not have to be manifested in formal political movements, but can be done with massive pious behavior to create a social transformation. This kind of movement is then called "piety politics". (Mahmood, 2011)

The politics of piety represents Muslim society practicing its religious imagination in public to fight against elements that contradict universal religious values. This action is in the form of religious rituals or acts of piety using religious instruments, such as mosques, *majlis taklim* (religious study forums), and other religious symbols. The politics of piety is also part of everyday socio-political practices (everyday life) with the main goal of social transformation using the shift in "ethical formation" that is developing in society.

Mosques become strategic places in the political movement of piety because theological and sociological aspects support them. When the mosque is positioned as the center of Islamic Da'wah, then sociologically, the mosque functions as a space where social transformation is designed and practiced. The practice of social-religious transformation will certainly intersect with other religious mass

organizations. So, the formulation of the problem that needs to be raised is: First, How are the shift and dynamics of the function of the mosque in Islamic da'wah? Second, How is the negotiation and contestation of the Islamic da'wah space between the mosque and Islamic mass organizations?

2. METHODS

This study aims to answer the question of the social function map of the mosque in Islamic preaching. The changes and developments in the social function of the mosque occur along with the shifts and socio-political changes within the scope of space and time. In addition, this study also explains how the negotiation and contestation of mosques in Islamic preaching with religious mass organizations develop in society. The resulting explanation will provide a picture that social compromise is necessary in practicing power. In the process of social compromise, religious sensitivity will be seen to have a lot of space to be represented in pious politics. To answer this question, the author conducted research in Kudus Regency with observation of participants in a qualitative research approach, where social practices, values, and symbols in the field are interpreted and described. (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000) In addition to observing participants, this research also collects data using interview techniques with various parties involved in the contestation between mosque institutions and religious institutions in the location.

This study not only describes the reality of political sociology about the relationship between mosques and religious mass organizations, but theoretically displays a slightly different variant in the debate on Islamic political thought. The impression that political thought tends to lead to formal political studies (Islamism) is expected to shift slightly to attention to politics in everyday life (everyday politics) or is often associated with the term "post-Islamism", (Bayat, 2013) where the power of agency moves across multiple lines, crossing religious and secular discourses that are often treated as binary oppositions. (Bayat, 2007) Therefore, in addition to empirical data in the field, various kinds of literature that discuss social dynamics, among them are "Muslim Politics" (Dele F Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996) and "The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformations of Power Through Bedouin Women", (Abu-Lughot, 1990) which are also used as secondary data sources to help create a map of the functions of social institutions and the nature of contestation in the struggle for authority.

3. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

3.1. Political Discourse of Piety and Research Findings.

In some cases, the word politics is not only interpreted as an effort to achieve and maintain power in the realm of formal social structures, such as the state, political parties, general elections or other political institutions. In a more general definition, politics can be interpreted as who gets what, when, and how to get it. More specifically, politics assumes authority in allocating values. (Ethridge & Handelman, 2012) At this point, power and authority are important terms in discussing "politics". Politics is thus interpreted as a movement of power framed in formal institutions and as everyday life (everyday politics) (Boyte, 2004), where power is practiced and utilized to get something desired in a heterogeneous and plural society.

The piety movement is part of an effort to allocate values within the framework of Islamic religion in a social institution. What Saba Mahmood describes as the politics of piety (Mahmood, 2011) is a socio-political reality of how religious rituals in the form of religious studies carried out by women in Cairo, Egypt can work on the process of social transformation through the formation of ethical formations. The piety represented through religious rituals and Islamic preaching is, in fact, able to compete with

secularism practiced in formal political spaces and everyday life.

Indirectly, in this case, the politics of piety is positioned as a political practice outside the scope of formal politics bound by institutions (political parties, executive, legislative), or practical political processes (elections, legislation). The politics of piety is an instrument where power and authority are practiced. The power referred to here is not that can be localized, but is a disciplinary order connected to a network, not repressive but productive, and attached to the will to know (Haryatmoko, 2016).

When the ethical formation in society is too repressive and fills the religious public space, then the power embodied in each person in the community will try to express the desire to penetrate the existing repression. The ideal discourse of the mosque as a center of worship and welfare services for the congregation in the last two decades has filled the religious public space in Indonesia. The discourse was finally responded to in various ways by the congregation, with various backgrounds of the ethical format that formed them, so there were variations in the form of functions and roles of the mosque. This is natural because the model of human action assumes a natural gap between a person's true desires and socially determined desires (Mahmood, 2003).

Power is present when there is an asymmetrical relationship in the social process. (Abu- Lughot, 1990) The relationship between the mosque and Islamic religious organizations in social practices, as described in the previous explanation, illustrates the relationship of power when related to its function as a base for Islamic preaching. The tug-of-war of social functions occasionally gives birth to a field of discourse where the practice and strategy of power are displayed.

Indirectly, in the tug-of-war of the division of roles and functions of mosques with Islamic religious organizations, there is a practice of authority politics which Islamic scholars interpret as a social disposition strategy to practice and distribute power. There is a game of power, where a mask of representation always covers the authenticity of the self, and covering oneself with what is represented is a correct action. (Asad, 2003) This concept suggests that agency (self) cannot be separated from social relations outside of itself. Stability in controlling authority is built on the relationship between self-representation and social reality, which in Eickelman and Piscatory's study is related to three things, namely "ideology", "locality", and "function", they frankly say:

To answer the basic question of why authority exists, the complex relationship between the carriers and followers of authority must be considered, and three interconnected levels of analysis are apparent: ideological, locational, and functional (Dele F Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996).

The process of achieving the authority to implement social functions in the mosque arena is an important discussion in this article. There are at least two important issues in the research conducted by the author related to this theme. First, the map of Islamic religiosity and the function of the mosque. Second, the mosque is in the vortex of contestation and negotiation of social functions.

3.2. Map of Islamic Religiousness and Function of Mosques

As part of the elements of Islamic religiosity in the current era, Mosques have a dual role in their function as a basis for socio-religious movements. On the one hand, mosques are facilities and infrastructure for worship for Muslims, and on the other hand, mosques are a space where Muslim communities carry out Islamic da'wah movements. Za'im, one of the activists at the Al Hidayah mosque, said, "The ideal mosque for us is a center for the Islamic missionary movement that cares about the problems faced by society" (interview, June 12, 2024). This role goes hand in hand with the social

dynamics and socio-cultural realities of Muslim society. The first role, namely as a means of *mahdhah* worship, is relatively stable because it is directly related to God which has been regulated in the holy book. However, the second role, where the function of the mosque must be in touch with social dynamics, must automatically rub against the social dynamics that develop in one place and at one time.

The informant's statement above provides an overview of three things regarding the relationship between community religiosity and the function of the mosque. First, the nature of Islamic preaching in Kudus Regency, where this research was conducted. Islamic preaching and commerce are two important elements in the lives of Muslim society in Kudus Regency. These two things are at least reflected in the long history of the entry of Islam in Java and the Archipelago, where Kudus is one of the *epicenters* of the spread of Islam. The figure who spread Islam in Kudus, Sheikh Ja'far Shadiq, known as Sunan Kudus, is a figure who is not only known as a religious expert but also as a figure skilled in commerce. (Jalil, 2013)

The intertwining of preaching and commerce is what gives the religious character of the Kudus community which tends to be "*maliter*" where to become a pious Muslim does not have to be confined in all kinds of deficiencies and backwardness but must be able to stand tall and be able to live decently and be at the forefront of prosperity. Prosperity and piety are important elements of preaching that preachers emphasize at the beginning of Islam's development in Kudus. So when the community wants to achieve a high level of piety, adequate and comfortable facilities are needed for worship. At this point, a decent and comfortable mosque becomes important as a place of worship. Moreover, in addition to being decent and comfortable, the mosque even tends to be luxurious, indicating a relatively high level of economic welfare of the community.

Second, the description of the connection between mosques and the religiousness of the community is the typology of mosques in Kudus. In terms of institutional structure, the characteristics of mosques in Kudus Regency are relatively the same between one mosque and another. However, there are differences in orientation and tendencies regarding management practices and religious activities. These differences in tendencies are based on location, scope of congregation in one location, function, and administrative area. The Ministry of Religion determines these categories through the Indonesian Mosque Council (DMI) unit. Quoted from the Mosque Information System (SIMAS) page of the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia, there are eight categories of mosques based on the criteria mentioned above. Among them are grand mosques, state mosques, national mosques, grand mosques, large mosques, *Jami* mosques, historic mosques, and mosques in public places.

In Kudus Regency, are 724 mosques spread across various rural areas and sub-districts. Of these, there are five of the eight typologies explained above. There are no state, grand, or national mosques in Kudus Regency because these three types of mosques only exist in the provincial and national capital. However, in Kudus, three historic mosques indicate that this city is an important part of Islamic civilization on the island of Java, built by the saints and other preachers. The detailed number and typology of mosques in Kudus can be seen in the following table:

Table 1. Distribution of Mosque Typology in Kudus Regency (Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia, 2022b)

No.	Kecamatan (Subdistrict)	Jami' (Jami Mosque)	Besar (Grand Mosque)	Public Mosque	Bersejarah (Heritage Mosque)	Agung (Great Mosque)	Total
1.	Kaliwungu	67	1	8	1	0	77

2.	Kota	119	1	7	1	1	129
3.	Jati	61	1	1	0	0	63
4.	Undaan	37	1	0	0	0	38
5.	Mejobo	42	1	6	0	0	49
6.	Jekulo	83	1	2	0	0	86
7.	Bae	60	1	3	0	0	64
8.	Gebog	102	1	8	0	0	111
9.	Dawe	72	1	33	1	0	107
	Jumlah	643	9	68	3	1	724

From the table above, it can be interpreted that the number of mosques in various typologies is directly proportional to the population density in each region. The data collected by the Mosque Welfare Council through the SIMAS application is still very tentative, because several mosques have not been registered. However, from the existing mosque data, at least it gives an idea that mosques in Kudus Regency are a vital facility in the worship of the Muslim community, both in carrying out *mahdhah* worship, and worship oriented towards social life.

Third, the existence of the function and role of the mosque cannot be separated from the religious mass organizations that are developing in Kudus. Based on this assumption, the mosque becomes a strategic place for preaching because in this place, the Muslim community depends on their religious behavior. In this place, the Muslim community gathers to get enlightenment from religious knowledge and to convey the values of goodness in religion and society. Therefore the mosque becomes a very strategic field of preaching for the Muslim community. This is by the opinion of one of the informants in Kaliwungu District who said that "to distinguish between pious and non-pious people can be seen from whether they are active in going to the mosque or not active in going to the mosque". (interview December 11, 2023) Practices like this indirectly become one of the channels of preaching from religious community organizations in various regions, including Kudus.

As one of the bases of Islamic preaching, in Kudus there have been many Islamic religious organizations born, both in the form of communities (congregations) and organizations (*jam'iyah*). Without denying the many communities and organizations that exist, there are at least three Islamic religious organizations with their ideological variants in the Kudus Regency. First, Muhammadiyah; second, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU); and third, the Salafi community. These three religious institutions certainly have different characteristics in managing mosques as places of worship and part of preaching centers.

3.3. Mosques in the Vortex of Contestation and Negotiation of Social Functions.

The similarity of social roles in different institutions often causes disharmony, even though the same ideology binds the institutions involved in the same role. Interests, differences in understanding, and weak institutional management trigger the role conflict between two or more institutions. The mosque is also not free from the impact of role conflicts between other religious institutions. This is because the mosque, originally a means and instrument for *mahdhah* worship, shifted its function to become a center for social worship activities that intersect with the roles of other social institutions.

The birth of Islamic mass organizations both before and after the political reform era increasingly enlivened the debate on the discourse of religiosity and secularity. Mosques, as part of social institutions, also played a role in their role as instruments of Islamic preaching. Mosques, which

were originally only used as places of worship, began to expand their functions, from their role as a means of religious education and distribution of *zakat* and *infak* to playing their role as a center for community empowerment. From observations made by the author, almost all mosques in the middle of the community carry out social worship activities, such as collecting and distributing *zakat*, *infak*, *shadaqah*, and even community empowerment. In this position, there began to be similarities in roles in different institutions, at least between mosques and Islamic religious organizations. The similarities in roles in these different institutions gave rise to contestation and negotiation between taking over roles, dividing roles, or compromising between the two. The nature and model of this negotiation are determined by the level of mutual understanding, the strength of the management and administration of the institution, and the strength of the interests of preaching owned by each institution.

From the indicators of contestation and negotiation patterns, it can be found that there are at least three typologies of distribution of the role of da'wah between mosques and Islamic religious organizations. First, there is a tendency to takeover the role and function of da'wah *bilhal* from religious organizations by mosque institutions or vice versa. The tendency to take over functions and roles between two or more institutions is usually triggered by a lack of understanding between institutions. It is compounded by weak management within the institution. Management problems like this are triggered by the strong influence of personal power in the institution compared to the strength of the organizational system. Problems that should be resolved fairly and proportionally according to the duties and functions of the institution, become overlapping and mutually negating. This kind of management irregularity results in the impression of rivalry between two or more institutions, even though they are still within the same religious ideological bond.

The author found problems like the above when there was a moment of collecting *zakat*, *infak*, and *sadaqah* funds, either during Ramadan, Muharram, or *Dzulhijjah*. Mosques and Islamic religious organizations carried out the same activities in one area for the same purpose. What was unique was that the people who became donors were also the same residents. The dominance between the two institutions could be seen when the accountability report for the acquisition and use of activities was read in front of the congregation. This showed a contestation in the two religious institutions, even though they were still in the same religious ideology.

From the above phenomenon, the author found that the tendency of mosques affiliated with the Muhammadiyah organization in Kudus is simpler in function compared to mosques affiliated with other religious organizations. This is because the institutional management system is relatively well-organized, so there is a more proportional division of roles and functions of the mosque. Meanwhile, most mosques characterized by the Nahdlatul Ulama religious organization and the Salafi community tend to have complete functions, not only as congregational prayers and religious studies but also as empowerment and management of community funds. What distinguishes the two is that the function of the mosque in the Salafi community is relatively free from friction with institutions that share the same ideology because they are more in the form of a community (*jama'ah*) rather than an organization (*jamiyyah*).

In most mosques with the "Nahdlatul Ulama model of religiosity," the function of the mosque is relatively complex, both in *mah hah* worship, *da'wah bil lisan* and *da'wah bil hal*. Most of them do not include attributes of the *jamiyyah*, such as nameplates, NU logos, etc. Although the way of worship uses the methods of the *Nahdliyyin*, which are closer to the nuances of culture, organizationally, there seems to be no connection whatsoever. This is natural because the mosque built was based on the community's needs guided by religious figures, who personally have charisma and emotional closeness to the

congregation. Obedience to individuals is stronger than obedience to institutions or organizations.

What is clearly depicted before us is certainly not limited to certain religious organizations, but there is indeed a tendency in "traditional" Muslim society, such a tendency is very common. The reality of the practice of da'wah on the one hand is considered as something that is not by good and modern organizational management. On the other hand the practice of da'wah in the relationship between mosques and religious organizations becomes one form of "counter narrative" to modern management that is very bureaucratic, rational and restrictive, by using cultural power, in the form of the practice of personal religious authority holders who are more dominant than the power of impersonal religious authority holders (institutions).

Second, there is a proportional division of roles and functions between mosques and Islamic mass organizations. In contrast to the first model, this second relationship model is relatively more structured in institutional management. Hence, mosques function as a means of worship and preaching and a wing for organizational development. In preaching management, the running of a preaching institution can be maximized according to the plan to the desired goal, if managed under one manager, either in the form of a person or an organizational system. This management concept assumes a rational order of society that can be controlled, predicted, and controlled. The structured model of mosque management and religious mass organizations have become popular along with the implementation of modern culture in various areas of life. This is inseparable from the contact of Islam in Indonesia with the movement of modernizing thought that has developed into an ideology of movement with various characteristics.

This kind of pluralistic thinking pattern can be read historically as leading to Muslim traditionalism, modernism and revivalism. In the same terminology, Haedar Nashir said that the ideological orientation of the movement that has recently emerged, such as neo-revivalism, neo-modernism, and neo-traditionalism, is a form of reproduction and re-actualization of the ideological orientation that developed previously. (Nashir, 2019) "The biological child" of these various thoughts is discussed in the previous description, namely NU, Muhammadiyah, and Salafi.

The phenomenon of the function of the mosque in the era of the Prophet can be explained critically that when the Prophet is interpreted as a person, the tendency is to prioritize the figure and its regeneration as the central figure in managing the mosque's management. In this assumption, the mosque tends to be independent, listening more to the orders of local figures than following a larger organizational system. This kind of model tends to be more conservative and suspicious of something that is considered new, to the point of being considered an enemy.

The existence of the Prophet in managing the function of the mosque can also be interpreted as an impersonal figure, in the sense that the system built by the Prophet is an important aspect in controlling the mosque institution. What was left by the Prophet was a congregation, not just a congregation. (interview with Muslim, July 14, 2023) In the congregation there is an organizational structure that runs the system, in which there is a division of labor according to the main tasks of each section.

Therefore, the main control in preaching is the system; meanwhile, the mosque is an instrument for running the system. This can be found in several mosques in Kudus: the mosque functions more as a wing for developing preaching from a socio-religious institution. Suppose the understanding of management is by this assumption. In that case, there is a tendency for the mosque, in its function as an instrument of preaching, to only receive an abundance of preaching tasks from the congregation system or larger institutions.

Third, the mosque becomes the center of a joint movement among communities (*jama'ah*) that are socially bound by the ideology of the Islamic religious movement. The peak of the goal of da'wah is to achieve a degree of piety with various efforts and methods. Meanwhile, the mosque is one of the instruments to achieve this goal. The author can find this type of mosque function in the field, where the mosque is used as a center for religious and social activities to achieve social piety. (Riesebrodt & Reneau, 1998; Wasisto, 2015)

Related to the relationship between mosques and religious mass organizations, then there a contestation and negotiation efforts between the two. In Kudus Regency, as mentioned in the previous description, the three large mass organizations, NU, Muhammadiyah, and the Salafi community, have different characteristics in the contestation and negotiation in representing piety through mosques. The following table illustrates the characteristics of the relationship between the two religious institutions and the form of representation of piety shown.

Table 2. Contestation and Negotiation between Mosques and Religious Organizations in Building Piety.

No.	Islamic Organization	Typology of Congregation	Relationship Pattern	Representation of Piety
1	Muhammadiyah	Neo-modernist	Compromising	Social piety
2	Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	Neo-traditionalist	Contested	Ritual/individual piety
3	Salafi	Neo-revivalist	Centralistic	Social piety

4. CONCLUSION

Etymologically meaning 'a place of prostration,' the mosque has evolved to encompass significantly broader functions. Beyond serving as a space for mahdhah worship (such as prayer and i'tikaf), mosques now operate as hubs for social activities - from economic development to political mobilization. This functional complexity transforms mosques into contested arenas where religious mass organizations vie for institutional influence. Building on this framework, the study identifies three distinct mosque-organization contestation and negotiation models. The first model involves competition over functional roles, where social and religious functions become subjects of contention within shared social spaces.

Second, proportional division of roles and functions between mosques and Islamic mass organizations. Mosques are positioned as instruments for expressing piety within solid management limits. Third, mosques become centers of religious and social activities by congregations or communities, without limits to their functions and roles as social institutions. These three patterns of contestation and negotiation illustrate that in expressing religious desires, Muslim society cannot be separated from the dynamic relationship between individuals who have an interest in worship, as an agency, with social dynamics as a structure that frames it. This relationship is always colored by negotiation and contestation on the mosque as an arena for expressing the political interests of piety.

In the end, the author emphasizes in this analysis that the debate in the discourse of ethics and politics of piety does not have to bring up who is more dominant, how they get a dominant position, and what the implications are for everyday political practices, as has been studied by political science scholars in general. This is because the politics of piety as discussed by Saba Mahmood, focuses more on the other side of everyday politics, which discusses how embodied power is practiced in a social space, thus forming a unique discursive tradition.

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