

Implementation of the Campaign Prop Removal Policy during the Quiet Period of the 2024 Regional Head Election in Tanjungpinang City

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Received: 16/03/2026

Revised: 20/04/2026

Accepted: 14/05/2026

Abstract

This study examines the implementation of the campaign prop removal policy during the quiet period of the 2024 Regional Head Election in Tanjungpinang City. The issue is important because the quiet period is designed to protect voter autonomy, maintain electoral neutrality, and ensure fairness before voting day. The purpose of this study is to analyze how the policy was implemented, identify the actors involved, and explain the factors that influenced the gap between electoral regulation and field practice. This research employed a qualitative descriptive approach using secondary data, including regulations, institutional documents, field records, media reports, and visual documentation, analyzed through content analysis and the Van Meter and Van Horn policy implementation framework. The findings show that although the policy had a clear legal basis, campaign props were still found in several areas of Tanjungpinang City during the quiet period. The implementation gap was influenced by low compliance among campaign actors, limited personnel and time, weak inter-agency coordination, and insufficient early mapping of campaign prop locations. The study concludes that campaign prop removal should be strengthened through preventive mapping, formal notification, joint field monitoring, public reporting, enforcement follow-up, and post-election evaluation to support electoral order, neutrality, and local democratic integrity.

Keywords

Campaign Prop Removal; Quiet Period; Policy Implementation; Regional Head Election; Tanjungpinang City.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Regional head elections constitute an essential mechanism for translating popular sovereignty into local political leadership, particularly in decentralized democracies where citizens directly determine the direction of local governance. In Indonesia, the direct election of governors, regents, and mayors has strengthened the political link between voters and local executives, while also increasing public expectations regarding fairness, neutrality, transparency, and administrative order in every electoral stage. The 2024 Regional Head Election in Tanjungpinang City therefore cannot be viewed merely as a routine political contest, but as part of a broader democratic governance process in which electoral rules, institutional capacity, and public trust intersect. The importance of this issue is reinforced by studies



showing that direct local elections in Indonesia can shape trust in state and political institutions, while perceptions of electoral integrity are strongly influenced by how election administration is organized and implemented (Al Izzati, 2024; Partheymüller et al., 2022; Medina Torres & Ramírez Díaz, 2015; Karp et al., 2018).

One crucial stage in the electoral process is the quiet period, during which campaign activities must cease to provide voters with a neutral atmosphere before casting their votes. The removal of campaign props or *Alat Peraga Kampanye* (APK) during this period is not simply a technical activity of cleaning public spaces, but a regulatory instrument designed to protect electoral fairness, prevent symbolic campaign exposure, and preserve the autonomy of voters in making political decisions. When campaign props remain visible during the quiet period, the boundary between campaign time and voter reflection time becomes blurred, thereby weakening the normative purpose of electoral regulation. This issue is academically significant because electoral governance is not limited to the formulation of rules, but also includes their implementation and enforcement in concrete administrative settings (Medina Torres & Ramírez Díaz, 2015; Partheymüller et al., 2022; Lundstedt & Edgell, 2022; Kusdarini et al., 2022).

In the context of Tanjungpinang City, the problem emerged when several campaign props for mayoral, vice-mayoral, gubernatorial, and vice-gubernatorial candidates were still found installed during the quiet period of 24–26 November 2024. This condition indicates a gap between electoral regulation and implementation practice at the local level. The draft thesis records that campaign props were still found in several public locations, including Tanjungpinang Barat, Tanjungpinang Kota, Bukit Bestari, and Tanjungpinang Timur, with the dominant forms consisting of billboards and banners. Such findings show that the issue is not merely about visual disorder, but about the ability of electoral institutions, local government, campaign teams, and political actors to comply with shared rules during a sensitive democratic phase (Karp et al., 2018; Lewandowsky et al., 2023; Temple & Langer, 2023; Kusdarini et al., 2022).

Previous studies on electoral governance have generally emphasized the importance of institutional design, administrative capacity, political party behavior, voter trust, and dispute resolution in maintaining the quality of elections. However, relatively few studies have specifically examined the implementation of campaign prop removal during the quiet period as a local public policy problem. This article positions itself within the field of electoral governance and public policy implementation by focusing on the operational gap between rules and field execution in Tanjungpinang City. The originality of this study lies in its attention to the quiet period as a specific implementation arena involving multiple actors, including the local election commission, supervisory body, regional government, security apparatus, political parties, candidate teams, and the public (Medina Torres & Ramírez Díaz, 2015; Lundstedt & Edgell, 2022; Kristiyanto et al., 2023; Temple & Langer, 2023).




Figure 1. Flow Diagram of the Existing Conditions of Campaign Prop Removal during the Quiet Period in the 2024 Tanjungpinang Regional Head Election
Source: Author, 2026

The implementation of campaign prop removal policy during the quiet period also needs to be understood through the lens of public policy implementation theory. Van Meter and Van Horn’s model is relevant because it explains that policy performance is influenced by policy standards and objectives, resources, characteristics of implementing agencies, implementer disposition, interorganizational communication, enforcement activities, and the external economic, social, and political environment. In the Tanjungpinang case, these variables can be used to examine whether the campaign prop removal policy was clearly understood, whether implementing institutions had sufficient personnel and operational support, whether coordination among KPU, Bawaslu, local government, and campaign teams functioned effectively, and whether political interests weakened compliance. This theoretical approach is appropriate because implementation studies emphasize communication, capacity, actor disposition, interorganizational relationships, and contextual conditions as determinants of policy success or failure (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975; Bayrakal, 2006; Alamoush et al., 2024; Medina Torres & Ramírez Díaz, 2015).

The urgency of this study is strengthened by the fact that campaign prop removal during the quiet period involves a tension between legal obligation and political interest. Candidate teams may have an incentive to maintain visual exposure until the final days before voting, while election organizers and local authorities are required to enforce neutrality, order, and fairness. This tension can create implementation problems, especially when regulatory obligations are not followed by strong sanctions,

sufficient operational resources, and effective coordination. Therefore, the issue deserves scholarly attention because it reflects broader challenges in electoral policy implementation, namely the difficulty of converting formal rules into disciplined collective action among political actors, administrative institutions, and the wider community (Lundstedt & Edgell, 2022; Bayrakal, 2006; Alamoush et al., 2024; Rauchfleisch et al., 2025).

This distribution suggests that the implementation problem was systemic rather than incidental, involving weaknesses in preventive notification, voluntary compliance, monitoring coverage, and post-campaign enforcement. From a governance perspective, this situation may reduce public confidence because citizens often assess electoral credibility not only from voting results, but also from visible administrative fairness before voting day. Electoral studies have shown that perceived maladministration, negative information, and weak administrative clarity can undermine confidence in the democratic process, making the removal of campaign props an important part of maintaining electoral legitimacy (Karp et al., 2018; Partheymüller et al., 2022; Lewandowsky et al., 2023; Kusdarini et al., 2022).

Based on this background, this article aims to analyze the implementation of the campaign prop removal policy during the quiet period of the 2024 Regional Head Election in Tanjungpinang City. The discussion focuses on how the policy was implemented, which actors were involved, what obstacles emerged, and how coordination, resources, institutional commitment, and political compliance influenced policy performance. Scientifically, this study contributes to the literature on electoral governance by showing that the quiet period is not only a procedural stage, but also a critical test of local democratic discipline, institutional coordination, and public policy implementation capacity. Practically, the study is expected to provide recommendations for strengthening future campaign governance, particularly in improving early coordination, enforcement mechanisms, participant compliance, and the credibility of local electoral administration.

2. METHOD

This study employed a qualitative descriptive design using secondary data as the sole basis of analysis. The research focused on examining the implementation of the campaign prop removal policy during the quiet period of the 2024 Regional Head Election in Tanjungpinang City by interpreting regulatory documents, institutional records, and documented field findings. The object of analysis was not individual behavior as primary interview data, but the policy implementation process reflected in written and visual sources, including election regulations, KPU decisions, Bawaslu supervision reports, coordination records, media reports, and visual documentation related to campaign prop removal. This approach was considered appropriate because the study aimed to understand the relationship between

formal electoral rules and documented implementation conditions in the field, particularly the persistence of campaign props during the quiet period across several areas of Tanjungpinang City. The use of secondary data also aligns with the research draft, which identifies documentary sources such as laws and regulations, KPU decisions, meeting minutes, supervision reports, media coverage, and visual archives as relevant data sources for analyzing campaign prop removal. (Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Bowen, 2009).

Data collection was conducted through systematic literature review and document analysis. The literature review was used to map academic discussions on electoral governance, campaign regulation, public policy implementation, and the quiet period in democratic elections, while document analysis was applied to examine the substance of regulations and institutional materials related to campaign prop removal in Tanjungpinang. The collected documents were selected based on their relevance, credibility, institutional origin, and connection to the 2024 Regional Head Election context. The analysis process consisted of identifying key documents, classifying them according to themes, extracting relevant information, comparing regulatory provisions with documented field findings, and interpreting implementation patterns using the policy implementation perspective. This procedure enabled the study to assess whether policy standards, institutional coordination, resources, compliance, and enforcement activities were reflected consistently in the available documentary evidence (Snyder, 2019; Miles et al., 2014).




Figure 2. Literature Review Process for Analyzing the Implementation of Campaign Prop Removal Policy during the Quiet Period in the 2024 Tanjungpinang Regional Head Election

Source: Author, 2026

The data were analyzed through qualitative content analysis by organizing the secondary data into several analytical categories: regulatory framework, institutional roles, coordination mechanisms, field

findings, implementation constraints, and policy implications. Each category was interpreted in relation to the implementation of campaign prop removal during the quiet period, with attention to the gap between formal rules and documented field conditions. To maintain research credibility, the study applied source triangulation by comparing information from different secondary materials, such as regulations, institutional documents, media reports, and visual evidence. Ethical considerations were addressed by using publicly available or institutionally documented data, avoiding manipulation of information, and presenting findings objectively in accordance with academic standards.

3. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Existing Conditions of Campaign Prop Removal during the Quiet Period

The results of the secondary data analysis show that the campaign prop removal policy during the quiet period in the 2024 Tanjungpinang Regional Head Election had a clear normative foundation. The campaign stage ended on 23 November 2024, while the quiet period was implemented from 24 to 26 November 2024 before voting day on 27 November 2024. Within this framework, campaign props were required to be removed so that the quiet period could function as a neutral space for voters.



Figure 3. One of the campaign equipment drop-off points in Tanjungpinang City
Source: Author, 2026

This finding indicates that the policy problem did not emerge from the absence of formal rules, but from the gap between regulatory clarity and implementation practice in public spaces. The official regulation on the 2024 regional election schedule and campaign governance confirms the legal basis for this stage and the obligation to organize campaigns according to the established electoral timetable (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2024).

The secondary data also show that campaign props were still found in several areas of Tanjungpinang City during the quiet period. The documented findings recorded campaign props in Tanjungpinang Barat, Tanjungpinang Kota, Bukit Bestari, and Tanjungpinang Timur, with billboards and banners as the dominant forms of remaining campaign materials. This condition reflects an implementation gap because campaign props should no longer have been displayed once the quiet period had begun. The persistence of visual campaign materials in public areas demonstrates that formal compliance by political actors was not fully achieved, even though the policy had already defined the time limit for removal. This situation strengthens the finding that the issue was not merely administrative, but also related to political compliance and field control (KPU Kota Tanjungpinang, 2024).

The distribution of remaining campaign props across several districts indicates that the problem was not isolated to one specific location. Instead, it appeared as a citywide implementation issue involving multiple public spaces, strategic road corridors, residential areas, and symbolic urban points. The existence of remaining campaign props in different districts suggests that monitoring and removal mechanisms had not fully reached all locations before the quiet period began. From the perspective of electoral administration, this condition is important because visible administrative irregularities may shape public perceptions of whether electoral rules are applied consistently. The effectiveness of election administration is closely related to citizens' confidence in electoral institutions and democratic satisfaction (Lundmark, 2020).

The remaining campaign props also show that campaign materials function not only as physical objects, but also as instruments of political communication. Billboards and banners carry candidate images, slogans, symbols, and party identities that may continue to influence public perception even after formal campaigning has ended. Therefore, the failure to remove campaign props during the quiet period may extend campaign exposure beyond the permitted time frame. In this sense, campaign prop removal is directly connected to fairness in political communication because candidates who retain visibility during the quiet period may obtain residual symbolic advantage in public space. Studies on political campaign posters show that campaign visuals operate rhetorically by shaping meanings, candidate impressions, and voter attention in public environments (Mangad et al., 2024).

The results further indicate that billboards were more frequently found than banners in several documented locations. This is significant because billboards generally have higher visual impact, larger dimensions, and stronger visibility than smaller campaign materials. Their continued presence during the quiet period may therefore have a stronger symbolic effect on voters and on the perceived neutrality of the electoral environment. The empirical pattern shows that campaign prop removal should not be treated only as a cleaning activity, but as a strategic enforcement activity intended to neutralize political

messaging before voting day. Political marketing studies emphasize that campaign communication can influence voter perception, candidate trust, and electoral decision-making, which makes the timing of campaign exposure an important regulatory concern (Vargas-Merino et al., 2025).

Table 1. Mapping of Remaining Campaign Props during the Quiet Period in Tanjungpinang City

Area	Documented Locations	Dominant	Implementation Meaning
Tanjungpinang Barat	Jl. Potong Lembu, Anjung Cahaya, Jl. Wiratno, Jl. H. Agus Salim	Billboards and banners	Campaign prop removal had not fully reached several strategic public points.
Tanjungpinang Kota	Penyengat, Melayu Square, Tugu Proklamasi, Jl. Pos, Jl. Merdeka, Kampung Bugis, Jl. Hang Tuah	Billboards and banners	Public campaign visibility remained in urban and symbolic spaces.
Bukit Bestari	Jl. Basuki Rahmat, Jl. Sultan Mahmud, Tanjung Unggat, Jl. Meranti, Simpang Jl. Engku Putri	Billboards and banners	Field removal required stronger coordination and wider monitoring coverage.
Tanjungpinang Timur	Perumahan Taman Gurindam, Jl. Hanjoyo Putro, Jl. R. H. Fisabilillah	Billboards	Remaining props indicated incomplete compliance and delayed removal.

Source: Processed from KPU Tanjungpinang City data contained, 2024.

Based on Table 1, the existing condition of campaign prop removal during the quiet period can be interpreted as a partial implementation process. The policy had been formally established, the electoral schedule was clear, and the institutional actors were known, yet the results of implementation did not fully eliminate campaign visibility from public spaces. This finding demonstrates that electoral governance depends not only on the existence of rules, but also on the ability of institutions and political participants to translate those rules into timely collective action. Research on electoral administration shows that perceptions of electoral integrity are shaped by how citizens and election workers evaluate the practical conduct of electoral procedures, including the consistency of implementation in the field (Partheymüller et al., 2022).

Institutional Coordination and Actor Roles in Policy Implementation

The implementation of campaign prop removal during the quiet period involved several actors with different mandates, including KPU Tanjungpinang, Bawaslu, local government, Satpol PP, political parties, candidate teams, and other supporting institutions. This actor configuration shows that the policy was inherently inter-organizational because no single institution could complete the removal process independently. KPU had a coordinating role, Bawaslu carried out supervisory functions, local government and Satpol PP supported field enforcement, while political parties and candidate teams were responsible for removing their own campaign props. The campaign regulation explicitly recognizes the need for coordination among election organizers, candidates, political parties, supervisory bodies, and local government in campaign governance (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2024b).

The analysis indicates that coordination became the main determinant of whether campaign prop removal could be carried out effectively. The existence of multiple actors created both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, multi-actor involvement allowed resources, authority, and operational reach to be shared among institutions. On the other hand, different institutional mandates, work cultures, and levels of urgency could slow implementation when coordination was not sufficiently synchronized. This finding is consistent with policy implementation literature which argues that interorganizational coordination is essential because complex policies often require cooperation across agencies with different responsibilities and administrative logics (Schwamm, 1980).

The role of KPU Tanjungpinang can be understood as administrative and coordinative rather than purely operational. As the election management body at the local level, KPU was responsible for ensuring that campaign stages were implemented according to the electoral schedule and that campaign prop removal was coordinated with relevant stakeholders. However, the practical removal of campaign props required field support from other actors, especially Satpol PP and local government units with public order authority. This indicates that formal responsibility must be supported by operational capacity. Collaborative governance literature explains that public policy implementation involving multiple institutions requires shared understanding, clear procedures, and sustained communication among participating actors (Ansell & Gash, 2008).

Bawaslu's role was equally important because the quiet period is a sensitive phase requiring supervision of compliance and prevention of campaign violations. The persistence of campaign props during the quiet period suggests that supervision and enforcement must operate before, during, and immediately after the transition from campaign period to quiet period. If supervision only identifies violations after the quiet period begins, the policy becomes reactive rather than preventive. Therefore, the findings show that campaign prop removal requires early warning, pre-removal mapping, and follow-up monitoring. Inter-organizational collaboration studies emphasize that effective collective action depends on trust, control, and risk management among institutions working in the same policy arena (Hickey et al., 2023).

The involvement of candidate teams and political parties was a critical factor because campaign props are produced, installed, and used for electoral interests by political participants. Even when government institutions and election organizers coordinate removal, the first obligation should rest on campaign actors that benefit from these materials. The findings suggest that low voluntary compliance may increase the operational burden on public institutions. This means that policy effectiveness depends not only on bureaucratic readiness, but also on the willingness of political actors to accept the end of campaign visibility. Studies on inter-agency integration show that shared missions and clear guidance can improve coordination, while limited resources and weak guidance may hinder

implementation outcomes (Headrick et al., 2023).

Table 2. Actor Roles in the Implementation of Campaign Prop Removal Policy

Actor	Role	Implementation Function	Potential Constraint
KPU Tanjungpinang	Election organizer and coordinator	Coordinates stages, communicates obligations, and facilitates removal procedures	Limited direct field enforcement authority
Bawaslu	Election supervisory body	Supervises violations and monitors compliance during the quiet period	Limited personnel for comprehensive monitoring
Local Government	Supporting government authority	Provides administrative and logistical support	Coordination depends on inter-agency readiness
Satpol PP	Public order enforcement agency	Supports physical removal in public areas	Time limitation and broad spatial coverage
Political Parties	Electoral participants	Ensure party-related campaign props are removed	Low voluntary compliance may delay removal
Candidate Teams	Campaign implementers	Remove candidate campaign props before the quiet period	Electoral incentives may reduce compliance
Public/Community	Social monitoring actor	Reports remaining campaign props and supports electoral order	Reporting mechanisms may not be fully institutionalized

Source: Author's analysis based on secondary data and the 2024 Tanjungpinang Regional Head Election context.

Table 2 shows that the campaign prop removal policy required a division of roles across formal and non-formal actors. The implementation structure was relatively complete because each actor had a specific function, but the effectiveness of the policy depended on whether these roles were activated in a coordinated and timely manner. The main issue was therefore not the absence of actors, but the synchronization of actor behavior within a limited implementation window. Collaborative governance theory emphasizes that cross-sector implementation requires institutional arrangements capable of sustaining principled engagement, shared motivation, and joint capacity among participating actors (Emerson et al., 2012).

Implementation Barriers Based on Public Policy Implementation Variables

The first implementation barrier concerns the relationship between policy standards and field execution. The policy standard was clear: campaign props should be removed before and during the quiet period. However, the documented existence of campaign props in several locations shows that clarity of policy objectives did not automatically produce compliance. This demonstrates a common problem in policy implementation, where formal objectives are well defined but practical execution becomes uneven due to contextual complexity. In this case, the policy objective was administratively

simple, but politically sensitive because it directly affected the visibility of candidate symbols before voting day. Implementation theory explains that ambiguity and conflict can shape implementation outcomes even when policy goals appear clear on paper (Matland, 1995).

The second barrier relates to resources, particularly personnel, time, equipment, and operational coverage. The quiet period only lasted three days, while campaign props were distributed across multiple districts and public spaces. This short implementation window required rapid coordination, accurate location data, adequate transportation, sufficient personnel, and immediate field action. If one of these elements was weak, campaign props could remain visible longer than permitted. Therefore, resource limitation was not merely a technical problem, but a structural constraint that affected the speed and completeness of policy implementation. Comparative implementation research shows that policy performance is shaped by the interaction between administrative capacity, contextual conditions, and implementation arrangements (Hupe, 2015).

The third barrier concerns the characteristics of implementing agencies. KPU, Bawaslu, local government, and Satpol PP have different legal mandates and institutional cultures. KPU focuses on election administration, Bawaslu on supervision, Satpol PP on public order, and local government on administrative support. These differences are useful when properly coordinated, but they may also create delays if operational responsibilities are not clearly translated into field procedures. The findings suggest that campaign prop removal requires not only formal coordination meetings, but also detailed task allocation, location mapping, field routes, and enforcement escalation mechanisms. Policy implementation scholarship highlights that implementation becomes more difficult when multiple organizations share responsibility but operate under different institutional incentives (O'Toole, 2000).

The fourth barrier is the disposition or commitment of implementers and policy targets. Institutional actors may support the policy normatively, yet campaign actors may have different incentives because campaign props provide visibility and symbolic advantage. This creates an implementation tension between administrative neutrality and political interest. Candidate teams may delay removal, assume that authorities will remove the props, or wait until the last possible moment. Such behavior increases the burden on election organizers and enforcement agencies. The implementation of rules in public settings often depends on how front-line actors and target groups interpret obligations, discretion, and compliance expectations (Lipsky, 2010).

The fifth barrier is interorganizational communication. The removal of campaign props requires the transfer of information from regulation to instruction, from instruction to field action, and from field findings to follow-up enforcement. Any delay in this communication chain can create incomplete removal. The findings show that a more systematic communication model is needed, including pre-quiet-period notification, documented distribution of responsibilities, shared monitoring lists, and

rapid reporting channels. The importance of coordination is supported by public administration studies showing that public managers need mechanisms to align decisions across agencies when implementation depends on multiple actors (Scholta et al., 2025).

The sixth barrier concerns the social and political environment of the election. The quiet period occurs when political competition is at its peak and when candidate visibility is strategically valuable. This creates a high-risk environment for non-compliance, especially when sanctions are perceived as weak or when monitoring capacity is limited. The persistence of campaign props can therefore be understood as the result of interaction between formal rules, institutional capacity, and political incentives. Comparative research on electoral integrity shows that doubts about electoral procedures may emerge when citizens perceive administrative failures or inconsistent enforcement in the electoral process (González et al., 2024).

Policy Implications for Electoral Integrity and Local Democratic Governance

The findings indicate that campaign prop removal during the quiet period has direct implications for electoral integrity. The quiet period is intended to create a neutral democratic space where voters are no longer exposed to active campaign messages. When campaign props remain visible, the neutrality of public space is weakened, and the symbolic balance among candidates may be disrupted. This does not necessarily mean that election results are directly altered, but it may affect public perception of fairness, discipline, and institutional consistency. Research on election administration demonstrates that citizens' trust in elections is closely connected to the perceived autonomy, credibility, and performance of electoral management institutions (Kerr, 2017).

The first policy implication is the need to institutionalize preventive removal mechanisms before the quiet period begins. Election organizers and local authorities should not wait until the quiet period to identify remaining campaign props. Instead, campaign prop mapping should be completed before the final campaign day, followed by written notification to candidate teams and political parties. This preventive approach would reduce the burden on field officers during the quiet period and strengthen voluntary compliance among campaign actors. Public management literature emphasizes that cross-sector collaboration becomes more effective when actors agree on shared objectives, role distribution, and operational procedures before implementation begins (Bryson et al., 2015).

The second implication is the need to strengthen compliance instruments for candidate teams and political parties. The findings show that campaign prop removal cannot rely entirely on government action because the materials belong to campaign actors and are used for political benefit. Therefore, the policy should be supported by clear deadlines, documented commitments, and transparent follow-up mechanisms. Public reporting can also strengthen accountability by allowing citizens to identify remaining campaign props and submit evidence to electoral institutions. Electoral integrity research

shows that skepticism toward electoral processes can grow when political actors challenge or weaken trust in procedural fairness (Schnaudt et al., 2023).

The third implication concerns the environmental and urban governance dimension of campaign prop removal. Remaining billboards and banners do not only create electoral problems, but also contribute to visual disorder in public spaces. This is relevant for Tanjungpinang as an urban center where campaign materials are often placed along roads, intersections, and public facilities. The removal policy should therefore be integrated with broader public order and urban cleanliness policies. Research on visual pollution notes that political campaign materials may affect the aesthetic quality of public spaces and produce negative environmental and social consequences when not properly regulated (Rangel-Buitrago et al., 2023).

The fourth implication is the need for a more integrated post-election evaluation mechanism. After the quiet period and voting day, KPU, Bawaslu, local government, Satpol PP, and campaign actors should evaluate the location, type, quantity, and removal status of campaign props. Such evaluation would help identify which areas require stronger monitoring in future elections and which actors need clearer compliance obligations. The evaluation should also include lessons on logistical readiness, reporting systems, and enforcement coordination. Studies on urban visual pollution emphasize that sustainable public-space management requires monitoring, classification, and mitigation strategies rather than temporary responses after problems appear (Wakil et al., 2021).

The fifth implication is the need to build a local governance model that connects electoral integrity, public order, and collaborative policy implementation. The Tanjungpinang case shows that campaign prop removal is not merely a technical activity at the end of a campaign period; it is a test of institutional coordination and democratic discipline. A stronger model should include pre-removal mapping, actor commitment, joint field teams, real-time reporting, public complaint channels, and post-removal evaluation. This model would help reduce the gap between regulation and field implementation while strengthening the credibility of local electoral governance (James, 2012).

Overall, the results and discussion show that the implementation of the campaign prop removal policy during the quiet period in the 2024 Tanjungpinang Regional Head Election was supported by a clear regulatory basis, but still faced implementation gaps in the field. The persistence of campaign props across several districts indicates that coordination, compliance, resources, and enforcement must be strengthened. The study contributes to electoral governance literature by demonstrating that the quiet period is a critical implementation arena where local institutions must translate formal democratic rules into visible public order. Future policy improvement should move toward more preventive, collaborative, and accountable campaign governance to ensure that the quiet period genuinely protects voter autonomy and local democratic integrity. Contemporary campaign studies also show that

electoral regulation must continuously adapt to changing campaign practices, public communication patterns, and institutional challenges (Borz et al., 2024).

4. CONCLUSIONS

This study concludes that the implementation of the campaign prop removal policy during the quiet period of the 2024 Regional Head Election in Tanjungpinang City had a clear regulatory basis but was not fully effective at the operational level. The findings show that campaign props were still found in several areas after the campaign period ended, indicating a gap between formal electoral rules and field implementation. This condition was influenced by several interrelated factors, including limited compliance among campaign actors, insufficient early mapping of campaign prop locations, limited personnel and time, and weak inter-agency coordination among election organizers, supervisory bodies, local government, public order officers, political parties, and candidate teams. Therefore, campaign prop removal should not be understood merely as an administrative cleaning activity, but as an important part of electoral governance that directly supports neutrality, public order, and the integrity of the quiet period.

The study also emphasizes that future electoral policy implementation requires a more preventive, coordinated, and accountable framework. Election organizers and local authorities should strengthen pre-quiet-period mapping, formal notification mechanisms, public reporting channels, joint field monitoring, and post-election evaluation to ensure that campaign props are removed before they become implementation problems. Future research may further examine this issue by using primary data through interviews with KPU, Bawaslu, Satpol PP, political parties, candidate teams, and community members to obtain a deeper understanding of actor behavior, institutional constraints, and political compliance. Further studies are also underway in the broader field of local electoral governance, particularly concerning how campaign regulation, public-space management, and collaborative policy implementation can be integrated to improve the quality of regional elections in Indonesia.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to express sincere gratitude to the thesis supervisors of the Master of Public Administration Program, Universitas Maritim Raja Ali Haji, for their valuable guidance, academic direction, constructive feedback, and continuous support throughout the preparation of this article. Their supervision has been essential in helping the author refine the research focus, strengthen the theoretical framework, improve the methodological structure, and develop the article as part of the academic requirements for the thesis examination. The author also appreciates the supervisors'

encouragement in ensuring that this work meets scholarly standards and contributes meaningfully to the study of public policy implementation and local electoral governance. Any remaining limitations in this article are fully the responsibility of the author.

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